DC's Final Argument to the National Energy Board

This is the NEB's official transcript minus some of the ums and ahs


4043.  MR. ANDERSON:  Anyway, good afternoon, Madam Chair and Members of the Board, I
want to thank you for the opportunity to address this hearing.

4044.  I'm sure I need  not remind you that the Board's mandate is largely to
protect the public interest. The purpose of every regulatory agency is to ensure
that certain standards are met; in this case, to ensure that Enbridge and the oil
industry behave in a manner which will have the least possible impact on the
public for the maximum good. Corporate interests are inevitably governed by the
bottom line, and this, all too frequently, is in conflict with the public interest.

4045.  Our focus at DurhamCLEAR is principally on Durham region, which
is a regional municipality just east of Toronto with a population of roughly half a
million. This population is -- lives in -- primarily in five local municipalities
located along the North Shore of Lake Ontario and through which Line 9 passes.

4046.  Our first awareness of Line 9 came in the form of an email from
Environmental Defence and when I reviewed the contact logs submitted by
Enbridge that appears to have been the prevalent situation with most of the
municipalities along the route. These municipalities got a letter from
Environmental Defence, which was followed by a letter from Enbridge to refute
it. I think we all owe a debt of gratitude to Environmental Defence for shining a
light on this project.

4047.  DurhamCLEAR is an environmental organization, and as has already
pointed out, the CLEAR part stands for Citizens Lobby for Environmental
Awareness and Responsibility. We have a broad interest in a number of issues
and this is just one of them.

4048.  Our initial impression of Enbridge's application was probably typical
of many, where is this pipeline? After 35 years without any problems, hardly
anybody knew anything. However, the more we and others have found out about
Line 9 the greater the apprehension. When we decided to seek intervenor status
and began directing questions to Enbridge, the more concerned we became with
this project. Since these hearings are about the public interest, we felt it was
appropriate to find out directly what the public thought and to use that to help
shape our own position.

4049.  We held three public meetings in three different areas of the region
and these meetings were advertised to the extent that we could afford.
Unfortunately, the attendance was not as great as we had hoped but overall I think
the results reflect the views of the community at large.

4050.  I should point out at this point that the Region of Durham submitted a
letter of comment, as did two of the constituent municipalities, and the positions
taken in these three letters are in broad agreement with our position and with the
positions expressed from our questionnaire.

4051.  Can I have the first slide, please, which is our Exhibit A, it's our
questionnaire. I'm not going to go through it in any great detail, but there are a
few questions here which I think we should -- I should highlight.

4052.  One of the questions, probably one of the most important was:
"Assuming that oil will continue to be transported in large
quantities, rank the following options as the most appropriate
transportation method for oil?"

4053.  One being the best, hence the largest numbers -- hence the larger
numbers are the least favourite.

4054.  The preferred option by a wide margin was a new modern pipeline
built farther north away from the populated areas and avoid environmentally
sensitive areas with a low score of 34. The next best was a new pipeline along the
current alignment rebuilt to modern standards with a score of 49. Road and rail
was third with a score of 64. The current pipeline, as is, with increased safety,
more valves, better leak detection, emergency response with a score of 66, and the
current pipeline, as is, was dead last with a score of 87.

4055.  I should note that this was about three weeks after the Lac Mégantic
accident and road and rail still ranked well  above the current pipeline.

4056.  We asked about regulation. Most participants regarded Canada’s
regulation of all forms of transportation of hazardous materials as grossly
inadequate. A majority also felt that avoidable spills of hazardous materials
should be regarded as criminal acts with executives subject to heavy fines and
possible imprisonment.

4057.  The world is changing and the public is far less tolerant of corporate
shortcuts. If extreme remedies, such as expressed in the above answer, are the
only things that corporate executives will respond to, then such measures need to
be implemented.

4058.  We ask specifically about the three applications from Enbridge before
the Board and I will come back to these responses later.

4059.  As an environmental organization, DurhamCLEAR monitors
processes whereby potentially damaging projects are approved. The standard for
approval of even minor projects is an environmental assessment. We went
through Enbridge’s current application and was surprised that the only
environment that they were acknowledging were the tiny patches of land at the
terminal’s densitometer station and four pump stations.

4060.  It was clearly Enbridge’s preference and intention to confine these
hearings to those tiny patches of land. And I commend the NEB for recognizing a
public interest beyond those tiny patches and for recognizing that this was not an
application about construction but rather about changes to a line which affected
every kilometre, all the land and all the people along the land.

4061.  I have read the comments of Darko Matovic of the Ontario Pipeline
Probe from the hearings last week and I am hoping that his interpretation of these
hearings are incorrect. However, they are a concern.

4062.  Enbridge has not been transparent, and clearly they’re hoping that
because the pipeline was pre-existing that it could get a pass on most aspects of
their application.

4063.  We undertook to find out what had been done back in 1975 in terms of
an environmental assessment. It was part of the NEB mandate back then, as it is
now. But looking through the documentation, we’ve been able to uncover we do
not believe it ever had a sufficient EA.

4064.  Can you give me the next slide, please?
4065.  THE REGULATORY OFFICER:  What did you want?
4066.  MR. ANDERSON:  The next slide. It’s the C12-6-4, which was the
IPL decision. That’s the one. This is just the title page of it.

4067.  To investigate, I went to the original NEB proceedings in 1975 and
read the decision that allowed its construction, and even the Board at the time
commented on some of these things, and I quote -- so you can go to the next one,
which is page 30.

4068.  And I quote:
“The environmental report of the Applicant’s consultant for
[…] Ontario […] of the pipeline contained generalized
information [of] the existing environmental setting...”

4069.  A little farther down it says:
“It included general descriptions of sites having commercial,
recreational, scientific, historic, archaeological, aesthetic and
conservation values.”

4070.  And a little bit farther down again it says:
“It also contained general statements on environmental
considerations with respect to various components of the

4071.  Next page, which is page 31. The next page discusses the Quebec
portion of the line and there is a substantial change in tone. Note that the Quebec
portion of the line is only about 10 percent of the whole.
“The environmental report of the Applicant’s consultant for the
Quebec portion of the pipeline described the existing physical,
biological and land-use (socio-cultura1) environmental setting
as well as the potential impacts of the proposed pipeline on
these environmental components. The report also included
recommendations regarding measures to mitigate such
environmental impacts. The Applicant’s consultant also
recommended possible re-routing of the pipeline in order to
avoid certain potential adverse effects on the environment.”

4072.  Now onto page 34.
“Further, the Applicant’s consultant [probably the one from
Ontario] emphasized that the environmental work for the
proposed pipeline would be carried out in four phases, in
relation to the phases of the pipeline project, as follows:...”

4073.  Phase I, which was the pre-application one, which was filed along with
the application; Phase II was to be submitted before construction began; Phase III
was to be during construction and Phase IV was to be after construction.

4074.  Then if you go on to page 45 -- Adobe page 45, we see the comments
that the Board comments on this phased
“It is noted that the Applicant plans to conduct environmental
studies in four phases. While such studies could be carried out
in four phases in relation to corporate planning and decision
making in [relation] of the project the scope of the phased
studies as outlined in the evidence is inappropriate and
inadequate in relation to the Board’s regulatory procedure.
The Board believes that more definitive work could have and
should have been included in phase one of the environmental
program which is the phase available to the Board and
interested parties at the time of hearing the Application.”

4075.  As the Board indicated, what was done was not how an environmental
assessment was meant to be performed. Generally speaking, the environmental
assessment should have considered, in detail, a number of possible routes. There
is in the ruling a mention that two other routes were considered, a route from
Sault Ste. Marie and another from Manitoba north of Lake Superior, however,
these were rejected because of higher capital costs and time of construction. And
believe me, there’s only just a sort of a one line thing that mentions those two.

4076.  Having made the decision to go directly from Sarnia to Montreal, IPL
selected a route which was pretty much the shortest distance between two points,
and, in quotes, “it parallels existing utility and pipeline corridors”. The result is a
pipeline that goes through the most densely populated part of Canada and through
numerous environmentally sensitive areas. And we’ve heard from a couple of
those today.

4077.  It is our contention that a route that went well north of Toronto and
north of the Oakridge’s moraine would have been preferable, and it’s our
contention that a proper environmental assessment  -- if a proper environmental
assessment had been done such a route might have been selected.

4078.  And if you go to the next one, which is the attachment to Équiterre,
BB18-20, Attachment 1 to Équiterre 1.j -- that’s the one.

Chart of Watercrossings

4079.  DurhamCLEAR’s particular concern with this route is illustrated with
this chart which Enbridge submitted in response to an information request from
Équiterre. The vertical blue lines represent water crossings. And that section near the left-hand side [starting at approx kilometre post 3097 with the tight pack of blue lines is Durham Region]. You can readily see 
visually that Durham region has the highest concentrations of water crossings
on all of Line 9B.

4080.  Next slide, which is D40-2-2, Corporation Town of Whitby.
--- (A short pause/Courte pause)
4082.  MR. ANDERSON:  D40-2-2. It’s the attachment to their letter of

4083.  It’s a map.
4084.  Yes.


4085.  To illustrate our concern  further, here is a map of just one of those five
local municipalities in Durham. This is Whitby. And this map was submitted as
an attachment to their letter of comment.

4086.  The blue lines are obviously watercourses. The lighter blue are hazard
lands. The dark green are provincially significant wetlands. The lighter green are
environmentally sensitive areas. The pink is the Lake Iroquois Beach, which is
another geological feature left over from the last ice age, which is important for
groundwater collection and flows, and the red line through the middle of it is Line
9 and it passes right through the most sensitive areas.

4087.  If you count the water crossings, there are 12. The width between the
purple lines is approximately 7.5 kilometres. Twelve (12) water crossings in 7.5

4088.  Are we to seriously believe that this route underwent an environmental
assessment? Can we seriously believe that a proper assessment could not have
found a better route? The route here happens to be a hydro right -of-way.
Wetlands and rivers are not an issue when you’re putting overhead wires in but
they most certainly are an issue if you’re putting in a 30 -inch, high pressure oil
pipeline which is buried three feet deep.

4089.  Let’s say the current route for Line 9 was expediency, rather than
based on any environmental considerations. I would ask the Board to note that
the environmental consultant for Quebec, that IPL engaged, did recommend
changes in the route, in that small section that runs through Quebec, and that the
route was changed in order to mitigate certain environmental considerations.

4090.  Now, after having read the order from the NEB that allowed the
construction to proceed, I decided to look for Phases II, III, and IV that IPL was
required to file as work went on, because even though they would have been after
the fact, they would have constituted part of the EA according to the Order.

4091.  I asked Michael Benson where I might find the documents, and he
directed me to the NEB library, and thus began a series of emails back and forth
that went on for two months.  

4092.  If you can’t find them, that’s fine. It doesn’t really matter, because
I’m not going to actually refer to it.

4093.  These emails are filed as evidence. They make boring reading but
they show that many of these -- those documents either never existed and/or do
not exist in the NEB library, or for whatever reason, can’t be found.

4094.  In fairness, because I was looking primarily for documents that had
some specific reference to the pipe in and near Durham region, there  may have
been a few more general documents that slipped through the cracks, although they
did send me many documents which had no reference to Durham.

4095.  The documents that they sent me appeared to be consolidated
somewhat by date and the titles were such that the only way to figure out what
was -- what they were about was to go through them page by page.

4096.  One of the documents was designated, “M-O75” and appeared to be a
Board Order dated June, 1975 which listed many studies which IPL was being
required to file with the Board prior to commencing construction. Many of these
doc -- many of the documents I received seemed to fit the general descriptions in
this Order. Collectively, these may have been the Phase II report, although none
of them contained any designation, as such, and all were pretty general in terms of
the environment.

4097.  Although I asked repeatedly, I received none of the environmental
reports related to the construction phase and none related to the post -construction,
as IPL had stated it would provide and as ordered by the NEB. Unable to find the
EA documents from the NEB, DurhamCLEAR submitted an information request
to energy -- to Enbridge and this was our IR 1, Question 4.C.

4098.  The question was, quote:
“Please provide all environmental studies done by Enbridge or
by Inter Provincial Pipelines concerning the section of the pipe
within Durham region, including studies done as part of the
approval process of Line 9 in 1975. Include all studies and
reports which pertain to Durham region, either specifically or
more generally.”  (As read)

4099.  And the report I got was:
“No environmental studies were completed within the Durham
region as part of the project because no project work is taking
place within Durham region. Any environmental studies that
may have been completed in 1975 are not relevant to the issue
in this proceeding.”  (As read)

4100.  We felt this answer was inadequate and we asked the NEB to require
Enbridge to answer, but unfortunately, the NEB sided with Enbridge.

4101.  So given the fact that the NEB library cannot produce the documents
requested and Enbridge refuses, DurhamCLEAR is forced to conclude that one,
they do not exist, and two, that a proper environmental assessment was not
completed at the time of construction.

4102.  And, as Enbridge’s environmental studies for the current application
only apply to the tiny parcels of land, which -- where actual construction will take
place, we conclude that an environmental assessment has never been done.

4103.  We believe that the environmental risks are certainly no less than they
were in 1975 and the current application makes those risks significantly greater.
And hence, the Board should require a full environmental assessment of the entire
line as a condition of approval.

4104.  If it does not, we will continue to press for such an assessment at the
provincial level.

4104a.  As I indicated earlier, one of the questions we asked the
participants at the public meeting was about regulation. They considered that
regulation of all forms of transport for hazardous good, whe ther pipeline or rail or
road, are -- should be much stricter. I am not an engineer but I know enough that
it is entirely feasible to build a pipeline today, which to all intents and purposes, is
leak-proof, barring some kind of catastrophic event, such as an earthquake.

4105.  It would be more expensive but through the use of thicker steel, more
corrosion resistant steel alloys and better coatings - tougher and less likely to
delaminate, a leak-proof pipe can be built. And in the public interest, the National
Energy Board should be requiring that all pipelines under their jurisdiction should
be upgraded to such a standard within, say 10 years. I understand that Enbridge
was touting such a standard in the hearings for the Northern Gateway pipeline in
order to assuage concerns over that line.

4106.  I would urge Enbridge and
the NEB to implement those standards starting right here in the most populated
area of the country. Enbridge, to all intents and purposes, is a public utility. It
enjoys a monopoly along the Line 9 corridor. The NEB is the regulator and if you
tell Enbridge to build a better pipe, they have no option other than to comply or
close down.

4107.  Any extra costs they incur they can pass on to their customers, which
amortized over 30 to 40 years life of the pipe, would result in only marginal price
increases. Enbridge has reported that there were only 11 leaks on 9B in the 37
years since it was built. I’m not an engineer, once again, but how thick would the
walls have to have been in order to eliminate all of those particular leaks?

4108.  I would suspect that the relationship between wall thickness and
potential ruptures is exponential and hence, it probably wouldn’t take much extra
thickness to dramatically increase the safety. What other modifications might
help eliminate those leaks? How many leaks would there have been if the entire
pipe had been a half inch thick walls instead of only a quarter inch?

4109.  Thicker walls would also reduce the risk of those catastrophic events
that I mentioned and even -- hopefully not but terrorist risks, which are becoming
more likely too. Let’s be straight forward; all the benefits of this pipeline accrue to
Enbridge and the oil companies, while the municipalities, landowners and
residents along the route bear most of the risks.

4110.  I realize that the standards for pipeline construction are defined by the
Canadian Standards Associations, Canadian in standard CSA Z662. So what I’m
really asking for is a rewrite to strengthen that standard. I don’t know how such
things get started. Certainly the pipeline companies aren’t going to request it but I
suspect that a regulatory agency like the NEB is in a position to make that happen.

4111.  Regulations exist to protect the public interest and in the absence of
regulation, all corporations, not just  Enbridge or other pipeline companies are
ruled by the bottom line. When a company says that it is meeting all standards,
what it is really saying is we’re doing the absolute minimum that we can legally
get away with. Businesses do not exceed standards unless it will save them

4112.  Regulations can never be voluntary. They must always have clearly
defined benchmarks and timelines. For pipeline companies, leaks and ruptures
are just a cost of doing business. While people are having their lives turned
upside down, the shareholders continue to make money.

4113.  And if you can give me C12-6-3, which is the Enbridge stock chart.

4114.  As evidence, I give you this graph of Enbridge’s stock price at the time
of the rupture at Marshall, Michigan.  The rupture occurred on July 25th. The
stock went down a whole dollar in the next few days and then a week later it was
right back up again.

4115.  I remind the Board that their function is not to protect the shareholders
of Enbridge but rather, the landowners and the residents like those in Michigan,
whose lives are -- have still not returned to normal.

4116.  When you read Enbridge’s application, there is very little information
on the operating pressures except to say that they were happy with and wanted to
continue with to have a maximum operating pressure of 1,000 psi.

4117.  Well, that begged the question -- and this is Question 5(a) from our
first Information Request, so it's IR 1.5(a):
"Has the pipeline ever operated at the 1,000 psi during its time
of service? If so, please advise when and for how long?"

4118.  We got a one-word answer:  "No."

4119.  So we asked a second -- in the second round of question:
"Can you advise as to what the highest psi in Line 9B has
operated at and for how long?"

4120.  And the answer was:
"In the past 10 years, the highest pressure on Line 9B was 666
psi at Cardinal Station on October 23rd, 2005 for approximately five minutes."

4121.  So it took two rounds of questions to find out that the pipeline doesn't
operate anywhere near the maximum pressure -- anywhere near the maximum
pressure that they want to have.

4122.  Obviously, there was some reluctance to give us that information.
Also, since we asked for the maximum psi ever, I think it's a fair assumption that
it has never operated higher than 666 psi, even  before the reversal of the -- in the
late nineties. We believe that in the absence of definitive testing of some kind to
prove that the pipeline is capable of withstanding 1,000 psi, the approved
maximum pressure should be reduced to 666 psi.

4123.  We also have very serious concerns about the number of valves along
the route, as do many other people. We acknowledge the announcement that
Enbridge made in the Opening Statement that it would install 17 new valves along
the route before the reversal, if permitted,  goes into effect.

4124.  Enbridge must be feeling some heat and has decided to cut some
ground out from under its critics. However, those 17 valves are nowhere near
enough. I have checked the location of those valves, and two of them are in
Durham, but I come back to the chart of water crossings, which is the Équiterre
chart again, which is B18-20.

watercrossings chart

4125.  The green dots across the top, the little green diamonds are the locations of the current valves. And this one here is in
Scarborough and these are the two that are in Durham region currently.

4126.  Now, the other thing -- the other interesting feature of this graph is the
green line, which is the elevation along the pipeline, this green line right here.
The bottom line is sea level, and the elevation of Lake Ontario is 74 metres,
which is roughly about there.

4127.  The first of the current valves appears to be pretty much at the lowest
point in Durham region, which is right about there -- if you run it up, it's pretty
much close to that; it's pretty much the bottom point -- at approximately 35 metres
above the lake.

4128.  The highest point appears to be around 125 metres, which is right
about here above the lake level. At that point, there would be 90 metres of head
or almost 300 feet with no valves between there and the bottom point. There are
71,300 barrels between those valves.

4129.  But Enbridge tells us that their valves are carefully positioned
according to what they call "intelligent valve placement". Well, when you cut
through the baffle gab, I would challenge Enbridge to explain the intelligence of
the valve placements in Durham region.

4130.  At least one other intervenor asked for an explanation of intelligence
valve placement and got an answer, which failed to answer the question.
Subsequently, I found out the location of valves is governed by CSA Standard
662.07, Section 4.4, and , frankly, the valve placements don't follow that either ;

4131.  One of the things that is mentioned in that standard is consideration
should be given to the installation of check valves to provide automatic blockage
of the pipeline. I assume this refers to gravity actuated blocks to prevent
backflow, and it sounds like a good idea.

4132.  Why aren't there any? Why not have a dozen of them between -- in
that place there, where it has a 300-foot drop? I believe that Enbridge should
frankly be consulting the municipalities through which the pipeline passes and get
their opinion as to where valves should be placed.

4133.  I further am somewhat leery of Enbridge's commitment to install these
valves before the reversal, if approved, goes into effect. And I think Toronto also
echoed that, that they wanted it added in as a condition that they do it, and
Enbridge is not well known for filling commitments.

4134.  I think that those two things that I mentioned there together should
form a condition of approval; that Enbridge consult with and obtain agreement
from all municipalities along the route as to the number and placement of valves
and that all installations must be completed prior to operation.

4135.  I now come to leak detection. In Enbridge's Opening  -- yes, this is
Enbridge's Opening Comments, Enbridge -- I don't have a reference on that one,
but anyway, it's their Opening Arguments. Anyway, I'll  just quote it.

4136.  In Enbridge's Opening Comments last Tuesday, in Montreal, they
specifically challenged the assertion that Durham made in our written evidence
"Their much touted leak detection system..." [this is quoted]
"...much touted leak detection systems next to useless."  (As read)

4137.  So let me explain why we consider their leak detection next to useless,
and the Board can draw their own conclusions.

4138.  In Enbridge's response to NEB Information Request 3.10.C, they
acknowledge that their computation pipeline monitoring system, CPM:
"...will not detect a leak below 70.5 [cubic metres], 443
[barrels] over a two-hour period".

4139.  That works out to 3.7 barrels per minute.

4140.  I was puzzled by the way the answer was worded as in  "70.5 cubic
metres over a two-hour period.", but after more investigation, I realized that not
only does it have to leak at 3.7 barrels per minute but it has to do so for two hours
before the folks in the control centre out in Edmonton will declare, "Ah-ha! We
have a leak!"

4141.  Now, I would conclude that a leak detection system that won't detect a
leak of less than 443 barrels is pretty useless.  Perhaps from Enbridge's point of
view, 443 barrels, it's small potatoes, given that the pipeline carries hundreds of
thousands of barrels a day.  But to any resident along the pipeline, the thought of
443 barrels flowing down their driveway or a local stream is pure devastation.

4142.  Enbridge has come out of -- has to come out of hiding and see the
world as the people along their lines see it. When people question Enbridge's
CPM system, Enbridge they then -- Enbridge then changes gears and talks about
their other overlapping leak detection methods.

4143.  Firstly, they have a plane that apparently flies over once a week.
Depending on what sort of instrumentation they have, that could be useful, but as
they replied to our Information Request 2.6 1(a), they found only one leak on Line
9 this way.

4144.  They also say they do ground patrols in Toronto but not in Durham.
But the most stunning admission is that more than 30 percent of the releases in
Line 9 were first reported by third parties, and third parties are considered one of
their overlapping leak detection methods. When they have to rely on us, I say that
Enbridge's leak detection system is next to useless.

4145.  So is this just Enbridge or is this the state of the industry? And if you
can give me -- actually, I'll just refer to it. It turns out there is a report, Leak
Detection Study provided by Kiefner & Associates just in September of last year.
And it was prepared for the U.S. Department of Transportation Pipeline and
Hazardous Materials Safety Administration. I am sure the Board is aware of it
and I am sure Enbridge is too. Reference C12-6-6 - DurhamCLEAR Exhibit E - A3J8F6 – adobe page 28.

4146.  In their analysis of the current industry, well, it turns out it isn't just
Enbridge, poor leak detection runs in the family. The statistics that they gather
from leaks in the United States were remarkably similar to the stats from Line 9.
And I quote:
"…based on data reviewed between January 1, 2010 and July
7, 2012 for hazardous liquid pipelines were:"

4147.  Their conclusions:
"1. The pipeline […] control room identified…"releases only 17 percent of the time.

4148.  2) "Air patrols, operator ground crew and contractors were more
likely to identify a release than the pipeline controller control

4149.  Number three:
“An emergency responder or a member of the public was more
likely to identify a release than air patrols, operator, ground
crew and contractors.”

4150.  And skipping down to number six because the -- four and five are
pretty technical.

4151.  Number six:
“For hazardous liquid pipelines, SCADA and CPM...” [which is what
Enbridge uses] “...systems by themselves do not appear to
respond more often than personnel on the right-of-way or
members of the public passing by the release incident.”

4152.  Hardly a ringing endorsement of what the pipeline industry touts as

4153.  On page 24, it states it is acknowledged that pressure flow monitoring,
which is what CPM is, will catch at best large ruptures. But is this the way it has
to be?

4154.  And if you can actually go to the -- page 183 in that.

4155.  And the answer to that is, absolutely not. There are many additional
leak detection systems -- that’s it there, right, which work far  -- which -- anyway,
which work well.

4156.  And the Board -- and the report lists several of them such as acoustics,
infrared optic hydrocarbon sensing fibre, temperature fiber optic, liquid sensing
cable and vapour sensing tubing.

4157.  On page 185, it describes the external acoustic sensors, and quote:
“…they are rated at a sensitivity of 0.1 gallons per minute with
location and -- with location accuracy rated at plus or minus
two percent of sensor spacing. They are also a continual
monitoring method, and therefore suitable for leaks that are
sporadic as well as small.”

4158.  The study undertook to survey current actual use of the various leak
detection systems. They managed to get the participation of nine liquid pipeline
operators, 10 gas pipeline operators and 12 suppliers of leak -- LDS, leak
detection systems.

4159.  All acknowledge the dominance of the internal CPM systems but it
was acknowledged by all operators -- this  “was acknowledged by the operators
not to be generally a sensitive method. It is effective only for large ruptures, and
even then not consistently so.” End quote.

4160.  However, another quote: “CPM is a relatively inexpensive addition to an
existing metering infrastructure.” Only a few of the external leak detection
systems were installed and all of the operators referred to them as being pilots or

4161.  Yet, they say, that these technologies have been known for 25 years,
since the late eighties, all are readily available, some are even described as being
mature. So why aren’t they being installed?

4162.  And I quote again from the report:
“Standardization and certification are -- was universally
regarded as an issue. Operators seek standard solutions that
give guaranteed levels of performance, according to some
certification. No current leak detection technology provides
this level of predictability. A similar gap…”

4163.  And I believe that also applies to the CPM but I might be wrong here.
“A similar gap may be described by the desire of pipeline
owners to operate, and not engineer, their systems.”

4164.  The result is an entire pipeline infrastructure all over North America
that either can’t or perhaps won’t detect so-called small leaks. As a regulator, the
National Energy Board has the power to correct this problem.

4165.  A company as large as Enbridge should be a leader and it certainly has
the capacity to work with suppliers and designers to develop and test these
systems and find out what works best and to help develop the certification of such
systems so that all people in the vicinity of pipelines can have the assurance that
leaks can be detected quickly.

4166.  I think that a condition of any approval of Line 9 should be that
Enbridge implement a leak detection system, capable of detecting leaks as small
as 10 gallons in real time, starting with the GTA area and working outward with
priority on populated areas -- populated and environmentally sensitive areas.

4167.  I’m being very generous at 10 gallons because, as I quoted before,
there are systems that will detect far, far, less than that.

4168.  And further, that Enbridge must share their data on leak detection to
the broader industry so that all, including the general public and the environment
can benefit.  

4169.  As we know from various sources, there were a couple of stream
crossings in Toronto that became exposed by erosion. This is clearly a cause for
concern. The exposure on the Rouge River is particularly troubling, as one
person who hikes regularly in the Rouge River has told me, that it was exposed
for an extended period of time.

4170.  And he said five years. But whether that is accurate or not,
we can conclude that the walking patrols that Enbridge claims to be
conducting weren’t very effective.

4171.  We asked a follow-up question with regard to Durham water crossings
and our request was, “When last were the multitude of river streams and creeks in
Durham region served for -- surveyed for erosion? What was found”.

4172.  The response was:
“All water crossings in Durham region will be surveyed for
erosion during the summer of 2013 and prior to that a depth of
cover survey was conducted in 2009 and there was no threats
at that time.”  (As read)

4173.  Evidently, the pressure of these hearings are causing all sorts of catchup work to be done. Clearly nothing was done in Durham between 2009 and this
year. And I’m not exactly sure what a depth of cover survey it is and while o ne
expects -- would expect that such a survey would detect erosion around a pipe, the
answer doesn’t actually say that.

4174.  Enbridge appears to have a policy of telling local authorities absolutely
nothing. We were informed by a witness that Enbridge had relocated a section of
Line 9 in order to accommodate construction of the new Highway 407. And so
we submitted an information request about it and we got the answer:
“Enbridge objects to the request as the information sought is
not relevant to the issues in this proceeding.”  (As read)

4175.  I’m sure many other intervenors are familiar with that answer.

4176.  What we wanted to establish is whether replacements were using the
same standard of pipe as was used in 1975 or do they use a higher standard of

4177.  I phoned up the Planning Department in Clarington where this section
was and was surprised they knew nothing about it, that they don’t have any
jurisdiction and that Enbridge never tells them anything. I got similar answers
from other municipalities and that’s a great lead-in into consultation.

4178.  As I mentioned -- as I indicated earlier, we in most municipalities first
found out about the application from the environment  -- from Environmental
Defense and after that Enbridge went on a PR blitz.

4179.  Ken Hall started by making the rounds of the Durham municipalities.
It didn’t really help. People wanted answers and he was delivering platitudes.

4180.  Through these hearings, and in the written evidence, the comments
from municipalities are nearly unanimous, that prior to about February or March
of this year, they had no contact from Enbridge. The concerns are remarkably
consistent too. Poor emergency response planning, not enough valves, inadequate
leak detection and yes, poor consultation.

4181.  The attitude of Enbridge  is best characterized by the word
“arrogance”. We’ve all heard -- we’re all tired of hearing the phrase “in the
unlikely event of a release”. We want to know what they are prepared to do about
it. We don’t want to be told about intelligent valve placements, where there’s no
sign of intelligence. We don’t want to be told that 90 minutes to 4 hours is a
reasonable response time for a leak.

4182.  The more we pursued the issue -- the Line 9 issue, the greater our
concerns. We found out the municipalities k new next to nothing. The pipe was
on the maps in the planning departments and it was on the do not dig lists but that
was about it.

4183.  The Conservation Authorities seemed to be somewhat more aware but
Enbridge had never asked them to provide river flows so that they could plan
ahead about an accident. And that was confirmed by our Conservation Authority.

4184.  Even the fire departments were in the dark and that brings me to
emergency preparedness and response.

4185.  When Ken Hall told our regional council, that response times to an
accident in Durham would be minimum to 90 minutes, there was silence. Then
the questions and criticisms start.

4186.  Initially Mr. Hall said he -- said that the local firemen should not be
involved in the spill at all. He even said that t hey should do nothing until
Enbridge arrived. Well, that went over like a lead balloon. You've heard similar
stories from many other municipalities and now Enbridge is promising to train
some first responders.

4187.  In their opening statement to these hearing s, Enbridge announced that
a maintenance group in Mississauga would provide emergency response to any
pipeline incident in the GTA. That doesn't really help very much because it may
be slightly physically closer than Belleville but the response time would  be about
the same.

4188.  Frankly, I think that Enbridge's thinking on emergency response
is ass-backwards. All of these municipalities have some sort of fire department,
all of the urban areas have professional fire responders on duty 24-hours a day,
some also have specific emergency measures personnel.

4189.  These people know their communities like the back of their hand.
They know where the hazards are; they know how to evacuate people. They
know how to deal with all sorts of injuries; they know how to deal with a host of
hazardous chemicals, whether they're burning or just lying on the ground. I
would suspect these people are far better qualified to handle almost any kind of
emergency than Enbridge's response teams.

4190.  It would seem logical that these people should be the front line. That
Enbridge should provide special training to a small group from each department
and that these people should -- would take charge in case of a pipeline leak.
Enbridge would provide coordination, equipment and training, and would pay
each municipality and appropriate sum for the use of their personnel.

4191.  Of course, Enbridge would have to do a fair bit of fence mending
before this would work, but it would also ensure that there would be an ongoing
channel of communication between the municipalities and Enbridge in perpetuity.
In addition, these first responders would be ideally placed to develop the site specific response plans that many municipalities are asking for.

4192.  I note that section 33 of the National Energy Board Ons hore Pipeline
Regulations specifically requires that:
"A company [Enbridge in this case] shall establish and
maintain liaison with the agencies that may be involved in an
emergency response on the pipeline and shall consult with
them in developing and updating the emergency procedures

4193.  Section 35 requires that:
"...a company shall develop a continuing education program
for the police, fire departments, medical facilities and other
appropriate organizations and agencies and the public
residing adjacent to the pipeline to inform them of the location
of the pipeline, potential emergency situations involving this
pipeline and the safety procedures to be followed in case of an

4194.  It seems that Enbridge has been completely ignoring this and   it seems
that the National Energy Board has failed to enforce their own regulations.

4195.  Durham region has a particular hazard that no other location has, and
we were particularly surprised at the insensitivity that Enbridge displayed.
Durham has two nuclear power stations, large nuclear power stations, and they
rely on Lake Ontario for their cooling water. We asked about this in our
Information Request 1.6k:
"What information has been provided to Ontario Power
Generation (OPG) with regard to contamination of cooling
water supply from Lake Ontario in the event of a spill? Has
OPG used this information in preparing an Emergency
Response Plan which ensures the health and safety of Workers
[of] the plant and the Public at large? Has this information
been shared with Enbridge? If so, please provide copies of all
such documentation relating to this matter.

4196.  In their response, and you can probably predict this, they said:
"In the unlikely event of a release, Enbridge would work with
OPG to manage water issues and protect water intakes."

4197.  That's it.

4198.  We followed with another more specific question and got:
"Enbridge cannot comment on OPG operations or the potential
effects of oil entering the cooling water in a nuclear reactor.
In the unlikely event of a release, Enbridge would initiate
emergency response procedures as described in Attachment 1
to Ontario IR 1.44...."

4199.  Can you see an emergency responder doing this consultation:
"These procedures include notifying the public and those who
may be directly affected, monitoring release behaviour and
extent to contain the release and identifying water intakes in
the area. As a result, OPG would be contacted if there were to
be a risk of oil entering [the] cooling water intake.

4200.  So OPG would only be contacted if Enbridge, after arriving on the
scene, let's say optimistically 90 minutes afterwards, and then takes, let's say a
minimum of an hour to figure out that the water is flowing down one of Durham's
many streams at a rate that will get it to the lake in X hours, and by the time they
notify OPG, well, it's already there. And clearly Enbridge has no idea what would
happen if oil went into the cooling intakes.

4201.  I would point out in connection with my previous suggestion for
emergency response that all the local first responders are intimately familiar with
what to do in case of various nuclear accidents and they've done simulations and
various things. And once again, the most logical people to develop the necessary
response plans are the current first responders.

4202.  I want to talk briefly about dilbit. I don't want to get into too much of
the detail because it's been gone over many, many times,but, I think the more
interesting question than what  dilbit is, or whether it's
corrosive or et cetera, is does anybody down the line want the dilbit. We sent
information requests to Suncor and Valero and the answers we got  --from both refineries, that both refineries were primarily focused on light crude.

4209.  Suncor went on to quote at some length in their argument last week to
say that they could process dilbit, but never really said they wanted to. They said
that they had processed a small amount of imported heavy crude and I guess
there's nothing to stop them from importing more heavy crude if somebody
wanted some asphalt.

4210.  The big market for oil is in the production of gasoline, and from the
information I have that requires coking if you're going to start from dilbit.
Neither Suncor nor Valero has coking capabilities and from their answers no
intention to install them.

4211.  Mr. Smith from Suncor dodged the question last week from
Mr. Richmond as to whether Suncor would close its refineries if any of Enbridge's
applications were denied. Instead, he launched into a treatise on price
competition. In the absence of any evidence that anybody downstream wants the
dilbit, clearly NEB should deny that part of the application.

4212.  So what does all this lead to? To answer that, I return to the results of
our questionnaire that we put to citizens in Durham region:
In terms of reversal, a narrow majority said they would
support reversal but subject to strict conditions. Those were:
One, upgraded to modern structural standards; two, better
emergency response times; three, more frequent inline
inspections and timely correction of defects; four, better
detection of leaks; and five, an increase in the number of
remotely controlled valves and the preferred option was that
there would be valves on both banks of all watercourses.
In terms of the application to increase the capacity, two thirds
of the participants preferred the rejection of the application,
but in the alternative, if the NEB approves the increase [in]
capacity then a similar set of conditions as outlined above.

4213.  In terms of the transported dilbit, essentially the same as for the
increase in capacity

4213a -- In terms of conditions that should be attached to any approval, we have read the
proposed conditions of the Board and we find them basically too
weak, too tentative in most cases.

4214.  One of the things that I would like to point out is that in some cases you are letting Enbridge define its own
benchmarks, which I find very inappropriate, and I refer you to your  proposal
number 22, which is the criteria to identify the major watercourse crossings along
Line 9 from Sarnia to Montreal.

4215.  Well, so you're asking them to define their criteria. Well, we --basically we know from the original application in 1975 that their criteria was navigability. And at that time, that you did that you -- the Board commented and
said, specifically:
"Navigational use of a river as a basis for the identification of
major river crossings is not necessarily consistent with
environmental aspects. The Board feels that what is important
is that relevant environmental considerations be taken into
account in locating and designing river crossings regardless of
whether such crossings should be designated as major minor
from a particular viewpoint."

4216.  Well, basically Enbridge ignored that and if you use the
suggested conditions that you’ve done here, I suspect they would ignore that too.

4216a. In terms of the conditions that we would like to put in  -- and I think I’ve
outlined them a little bit before 1) the NEB should require a full environmental
assessment of the entire line.

4217.  And number two, that the portion of Line 9 that passes through the
GTA should be relocated north of the Oak Ridges Moraine and should avoid
environmentally sensitive areas. The new pipeline should be built to modern
standards, thicker walls, corrosion resistant steel and better coatings.  

4218.  In the alternative, if the NEB does not require relocation, that the
existing alignment through the GTA be rebuilt to modern standards, - the same

4219.  And the condition three, that Enbridge implement a leak detection
system capable of detecting leaks as small as 10 gallons in real time, starting with
the GTA area and working outwards with priority on populated and
environmentally sensitive areas.

4220.  Number four would be that they consult with and obtain agreement
from all municipalities along the route as to the number and placement of valves,
and that all installations must be completed prior to operation.

4221.  And five, that Enbridge develop, in cooperation with the
municipalities along the Line 9 route, a new emergency response plan which
would have the first responders, fire fighters, et cetera, in each municipality
trained, equipped, and coordinated by Enbridge as the primary responders to any
pipeline accident.

4222.  And that’s all and if you have any questions I’d take them and…

4223.  THE CHAIRPERSON:  Give us a few moments.

4224.  MEMBER RICHMOND:  When you raised your concern about the
maximum pressure that’s been in the line, the 666 psi and the maximum
allowable, 1,000, in your view, is there anything -- looking at conditions, is there
anything that could appear in a hydrostatic pressure testing program, as described
in our Draft Condition 11 that would address your concern?

4225.  MR. ANDERSON:  I know from -- I’ve listened in to the comments
that Enbridge made about hydrostatic pressure in Montreal. I recognize that it’s  --it very, very nicely outlined the limitations of it So you know, in a sense, what I 
-- you know, I would have loved to have had a third round of questions because
there might have been a few questions that would have come out of that.

4226.  I frankly do not know enough about hydrostatic pressures to really  --hydrostatic testing to know what it -- you know, whether they would find
anything or not.

4227.  MEMBER RICHMOND:  I appreciate the frankness of your
response. Thank you.

4228.  THE CHAIRPERSON:  Mr. Anderson, those are all our questions